M
OST studies comparing wages across ever, to well-considered criticism, industries, areas, or occupations, as grounded in a charge of omitted variable well as most inter-metropolitan and interbias. In brief, it is suspected that workers state comparisons of wages within a given are more likely to organize in industries in industry, report a positive relationship which the potential gains of unionization between the extent of union coverage and are relatively large, and that most studies the wages of union members. Such a do not adequately control for acrossrelationship would be expected under industry differences in labor demand. either a labor demand model of union Thus, the finding that more heavily wage determination, in which labor deunionized industries have higher union mand elasticity declines as coverage riseswages could in part reflect organizing presumably because consumers have incentives rather than the effects of union fewer opportunities to substitute nonunion products for union goods or sercoverage per se. This argument is supvices-or a bargaining power model of ported by the observation that interunion wage determination. occupational and inter-area studies typiThe empirical literature on the union cally have yielded weaker evidence of a coverage effect has been subjected, howrelationship between coverage and wages than have inter-industrv studies.
The purported omitted variable prob-criticism and discussing some methodological considerations. In particular, we argue that there should be a positive relationship between local union coverage and union wages only in local labor market industries, not in national market industries, and that the mixing of these two species of industry in most inter-area studies explains the weakness of their support for the union coverage hypothesis. Finally, we test that proposition by examining data on one local market industry (supermarkets) and one national market industry (aerospace manufacturing).
The Omitted Variable Problem
Considering the inter-industry studies on the union coverage effect, which represent the bulk of the empirical literature on the subject (see appendix), Lewis (1986) , in an influential literature review, concluded, "I am not convinced that the wage effects picked up by the estimated a, coefficients are mostly effects of unionism rather than mostlv effects of omitted variables." Particularly in question is the sufficiency of controls for differences in labor demand conditions across industries. Economic models of unionization suggest that individuals are more likely to organize where there are potentially larger wage gains from unionization (Lee 1978) . In some industries. factors such as inelastic product demand or a lower elasticity of substitution between capital and labor will create the potential for larger union wage gains and encourage unionization. In inter-industry studies lacking controls for variation in such "Marshallian" labor demand conditions, coefficients on measures of union coverage will certainly capture the effect of such omitted variables and will be biased-likely upward.
Lewis found further support for his judgment from the typically weaker and more specification-sensitive results from inter-occupational and inter-area studies (see the appendix). This evaluation is buttressed by Hirsch and Neufeld (1987) , who provide evidence that geographic variation in union coverage is not significantly related to the wages of unionized individuals when industry coverage is held constant-although Curme and MacPherson (1991) counter that local area coverage is important about one-half the time when it is measured by MSA rather than SMSA coverage.
We believe the Lewis conclusion is unduly pessimistic. Our main point is that across geographic areas it is only appro~r i a t e to use local market industries in I studying the effect of local union coverage on union wages, and inappropriate to test the hv~othesis with national market indusi l tries or, as is often done, to mix local and national market industries in one data set.
Theoretically, there should be a positive relationship between local union coverage and union wages onlv in local market u , industries-a situation in which we observe different equilibrium outcomes given a variety of bargaining power situations and labor demand elasticities associated with different levels of unionization. In a national market industry, however, local levels of unionization will not necessarily influence union wages. This point is obvious where there is national bargaining. But even in other national product industries, high local levels of unionization will not necessarily result in higher local union wages, because consumers are still able to substitute nonunion goods produced outside the area for local union ~roducts. Most inter-' area studies have mixed the two types of industries, so (we argue) it is not surprising that they have provided only weak support for the union coverage hypothesis.
We illustrate our argument with new empirical research on two industries. One is a local market industry highly suited for determining the union coverage-union wage relationship: supermarkets. The other is a national market industrv: aerospace manufacture. Mar. 6, 1991) . Strong patterns across different firms also existed until the end of the 1980s, when they apparently moderated to some extent (Cimini 1991; Erickson, 1992) . Under such arrangements-national bargaining with strong inter-firm patterns, national product markets, and institutions that reinforce bargaining patterns-there is little latitude for local labor market conditions to influence union wages.
' Engineers and technicians are also organized at some firms and can form large bargaining units. At Boeing, 15,000 engineers and 12,000 technicians are members of the independent Seattle Professional Engineering Employees Association.
Supermarkets
In contrast to aerospace, supermarkets operate in local or regional product and labor markets and bargain locally or regionally. National firms are of declining importance as prominent chains, such as A&P and Safeway, withdraw from some areas. The majority of supermarkets are local or members of chains covering only several states. Even within large regional and national chains, employees are recruited locally at all but the highest levels of management. The primary union in the industry is the United Food and Commercial Workers.
The local nature of bargaining is reflected in the dispersion of recent wage settlements across the nation. In 1990, top-rated clerks received a wage increase of $1.65 per hour over 38 months in Los Angeles (BNA LRW, Sept. 15, 1990), a $1.15 increase over four years in Portland, Oregon (BNA LRW, Sept. 15, 1990) , an increase of more than $2.00 in a three-year agreement with Stop and Shop in Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts (BNA LRW, Feb. 20, 1991) , a $0.45 increase over two years with Florida Supermarkets (BNA LRW, Apr. 10, 1991), and a $1.00 per hour reduction with Food Barn in Kansas City (BNA LRW, May 29, 1991) .
Although formal and informal bargaining structures create wage and benefit patterns within metropolitan areas or regions, there is little evidence of patterns between non-contiguous metropolitan areas.2 Obviously, few consumers are willing to commute outside contiguous metropolitan areas in order to buy groceries. Consequently, we expect local labor market conditions, including the level of local supermarket unionization, to have considerable influence on both union and nonunion wages in the supermarket industry.
Measuring the Effect of Union
Density on Union Wages
Data on individuals in the aerospace and supermarket industries were obtained %n apparent exception to this rule is the Kroger chain, which has similar settlements in its stores throughout the Midwest and South. from the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPS outgoing rotation files for 1987 and 198ge3 Union density in the supermarket industry and the aerospace industry was calculated for each metropolitan area for the period 1987-89. T o avoid excessive measurement error in the coverage variable, individuals in cities with fewer than 40 observations in their same industry were omitted from the study. This step limited the sample to persons residing in 73 relatively large metropolitan areas.4 The resulting data set had 1,588 union and 2,801 nonunion observations in supermarkets and 712 union and 1,422 nonunion observations in a e r o~p a c e .~ The wage variable was the ratio of average weekly earnings to average weekly hours expressed in 1987 dollars.
The basic specification of equations used to measure the effect of union density on wages using individual data is well established in the literature and was adopted for our study. Our vector of controls, a conventional specification, included experience, experience squared, years of education completed, and 0-1 variables for race, gender, occupation, part-time employment status, student status, region, year of observation, location in a city with a population of between one million and 2.49 million. and location in a city with 2.5 million persons or 'These files are composed of data on the more than one-half million individuals who participated in the Current Population Survey for each year. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out to us that although there is one observation for each individual on each annual outgoing rotation tape, pooling tapes across adjacent years creates two observations for each individual who remained in a given industry; for this reason, we eliminated 1988 from the sample.
The true proportion represented is equal to the sample proportion, P, with a 95% confidence interval that is plus or minus 1.96.[P.(l -P)IN]"~, where N is the sample size (Wonnacott and Wonnacott 1984: 240) . Our estimates change only slightly when we include individuals in all cities.
" Individuals who report being union members or represented by a union for purposes of collective bargaining have been treated as members and are referred to as being "union" or a "union member." Individuals reporting wages of less than $1.00 per hour were excluded, as were those with incomplete records. moree6 We were also interested in controlling for differences in cost of living between cities, but we found that there is no suitable comparative price index for the set of cities in our sample. We experimented with using the average real weekly earnings of all families living in a metropolitan area to control for both prices and other local influences on labor demand. Estimated coefficients were similar in sign and significance to those obtained without this variable. ' There is considerable disagreement about how wage equations measuring the effect of unionization should be estimated. Most researchers have used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Some argue, however, that individuals may select into the union and nonunion sectors and that such endogenous selection would bias OLS coefficients and standard errors. Others argue that when variables such as union coverage are introduced into a micro wage equation to pick up cross-individual forces, it is likely that there are other aggregated variables that are omitted. This would introduce an error component by the unit of aggregation (in this case, cities) and cause the errors to be nonindependent. OLS estimates remain consistent, but the aggregate error component causes the standard errors to be biased, often downward (Moulton 1985) .
As it is not our goal to determine the appropriate estimation technique for wage equations, our approach has been to estimate OLS models, selection corrected models, and error components models. The selection correction utilizes the methodology of Lee (1978) ; we follow Mundlak's (1978) random effects model in correcting for city-level error components. We report coefficient estimates for both
The West was used as the base region, 1987 was the base year, and cities of less than one million were the base for city size. Information on student status is available only for 16-24-year-olds, so persons of other ages were always coded as non-students.
See Belman and Voos (1992) for estimates with the average city family earnings variable. Because the city family earnings and the wage might be simultaneous, we also estimated this system in an instrumental variables framework. Again, the coefficient on union coverage is not affected by estimation technique. the selection corrected model and the random effects model in Tables 1 and 2 .8 From our point of view, the important outcome of this exercise in technique was that it made no difference to our results. Although correcting for selection or error components altered the magnitude and statistical significance of some other coefficients, the effect of union density on the wage was invariant in sign and significance across OLS, selection-corrected, and random effects specifications.
Empirical Results: Unionized Supermarket and Aerospace Workers
Our results for the unionized workers in the two industries are presented in Table  We find that the degree of organization of supermarket workers by city has a large influence on union wages.10 The coefficient is statistically significant and notably similar in magnitude in the random effects and selection-corrected estimates. A ten percentage point increase in the organization of the supermarket labor force in an urban area would result in a 2.2% to 2.3% increase in individuals' wages. This finding contrasts sharply with the findings for aerospace workers. In that industry, the coefficient for union densitv is small and statisticallv nonsignifikant in all estimated modeis. This difference between the two industries sumorts our contention that local union I I density will not influence wages if wages are bargained nationally.
In other respects, we find both similarities and substantial differences in wage determination in our two industries. For instance,
We use a LaGrange multiplier test (Breush and Pagan 1980) to test the random effects model against the null hypothesis of no city error component (the OLS model). The selection bias-corrected model was compared to the OLS model by examining the coefficient on the selection term for statistical significance.
The microcomputer package LIMDEP was used to estimate all equations. The programs and the underlying data are available on request.
lo This effect is in addition to the wage gain associated with being a union worker as opposed to a nonunion worker. See Belman and Voos (1992) for a discussion of the standard union wage effect in these data. the wage disadvantage of female employees is virtually identical in both industries. Parttime employees suffer a disadvantage in hourly earnings in the supermarket industry but not the aerospace industry (where parttime work is uncommon). Occupational differentials are notably different. For example, sales workers in aerospace earn a 38.7% premium over laborers, whereas sales workers in supermarkets earn only 8.6% more; and the earnings premium for professionals in aerospace is 3 1.8%, compared to only 11.2% in supermarkets. Such differences in occupational premiums, which probably are related to substantive differences in employees' skills and in the nature of the work they do in these broad occupational classifications, indicates additional limitations of inter-industry wage equations.
There are also substantial regional differences in supermarket wages, as well as a 7% wage premium for employees living in cities with populations of two and one-half million or more. In sharp contrast, the wages of aerospace workers are unaffected by region or by city size-again, probably due to national bargaining.
Some Nonunion Results
Although this study has not focused on the effects of union density on workers who are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement, we have estimated equations for this group of employees. There is some interest in the literature on the effect of union density by city on the wages of nonunion employees. This is a question on which both economic theorythe so-called threat and spillover effectsand earlier econometric evidence yield mixed predictions (see Lewis 1986 for a review)." Nonetheless, we would again expect local market industries to provide conceptually cleaner evidence than national market industries. The null hypothesis of no random city component in the error term could be rejected in a 24% test. RE coefficients were very similar to OLS, which are available on request. It was not possible to reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on the union density variable was zero in either the RE or OLS model.
Our estimates ( Table 2) indicate neither a positive nor a negative overall relationship between union coverage and nonunion wages for either aerospace or supermarkets. In both industries, the coefficient on density is always small and insignificant. The result for supermarkets is particularly important, as we have found that union density in that industry had a positive and significant effect on the wages of those covered by collective bargaining. The absence of such a relationship for nonunion workers further reassures us that the union coverage variable in the union equation is not simply proxying for omitted city characteristics influencing all supermarket wages. With regard to the more technical issuks, there is mixed support for correction for city error components. Although it was possible to reject the null hypothesis of no city error component in a 1% test for nonunion supermarket workers, the null hypothesis could only be rejected in much weaker tests for nonunion aerosDace I workers (40%) and union aerospace workers (25%). A random effects model for unionized supermarket workers could not be estimated because it was not possible to obtain a positive variance component. The results for the random effects models were generally very similar to the OLS results, further assuring us that omitted city characteristics (for instance, the cost of living) are not biasing our conclusions with regard to the effects of local union density.
Correction for selection generally had little effect on the union density coefficient in the union samples.'* In supermar- 1.075 Constant + .001 Experience -.067* Educakets, the coefficient on density in the selection-corrected equation was .004 greater than the OLS estimate. In aerospace, neither coefficient was statistically significant. Our estimates do not provide clear evidence that there is a universal need to correct for selection. We found that the inverse Mills ratio coefficients are statistically significant for both sectors in the supermarket industry, but not for either sector in aerospace. Why selection would be important in only one of two industries is not evident. Again, this result is indicative of a potential problem in studies that aggregate across diverse industries.
Concluding Comments
In recent years, economists have relied on large mixed-industry data sets in empirical investigations of union and nonunion wage relationships. In this paper, we have demonstrated why this practice is inappropriate for research regarding the effects of union coverage on union wages. Multiple industry data sets mix national, and indeed international, industries like aerospace, in which local union coverage logically and factually has no effect on nationally negotiated union wages, with local market industries like supermarkets, in which local union coverage is a major determinant of locally bargained wage rates.
The criticism that has been advanced regarding the earlier empirical literature on the effects of union coverage cannot be dismissed out of hand. Most earlier studies have focused on inter-industry wage differences. The typically positive and significant coefficient on the union coverage variable in such studies may indeed reflect characteristics of industries (such as product demand elasticities) that might be correlated with both union wages and unionization. The effect of labor organization itself is not isolated in such studies. Evidence across local areas within a single industry is greatly superior, providing that it is a local rather than a national market industry. Supermarkets are one such industry. We provide evidence from the supermarket industry that higher levels of union coverage are associated with higher union wages, as would be predicted by economic and industrial relations theory. Our new evidence is in accord with earlier studies based on other local product market industries with primarily local bargaining: construction (Freeman and Medoff 1981; Perloff and Sickles 1987) , hospitals (Cain et al. 1981) , and public education (Delaney 1985) . Consequently, we conclude that union coverage is indeed a determinant of union wage rates. Positive and significant for all occupational groups in the private sector, and for 3 of 4 In the public sector; 1 of 4 was positive but insignificant. Positive and significant effect on both usual hourly earnings and usual weekly earnings.
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